


Liren Chen, VP Engineering and Legal Counsel
Kirti Gupta, Director of Economic Strategy

Competition Data and Antitrust – a Corporate Perspective



QUALCOMM



Invent
~\$36B invested
in Cumulative R&D
over the past 30 years

Advancing technology through innovation and foresight



Foresight
Demand created for
higher quality voice

Foresight
Add data to the
network

Foresight
Using phone as
computing device



Invented
Digitized wireless
communications

Invented
Increased voice
quality

Invented
Data added with 3G
technology

Invented
First 1GHz mobile
processor

Advancing technology through invention and foresight

Foresight
1000x increase in video
on mobile



Foresight
Enhance experience
of video on mobile



Foresight
Billions of connected
devices



Invented
LTE Broadcast

Invented
Brought 4K into
mobile devices

Invented
Technologies that
enable IoE

Diverse patent portfolio

Covering all aspects of mobile devices



Apps processor



GPU



NFC



Position location



OS/user interface



Wireless charging



Camera



Security



Sensors



Semiconductor



WWAN



Video codecs



RF and antenna



Display



Audio processing



Connectivity (Wi-Fi)

Investment in technology standards years in advance

5G

R&D
 Commercial

2006
5G technology

4G

2002
OFDM

2009
LTE Rel 8

2011
Rel-A 10

3G

High Speed Data

1997
EV-DO

1998
EV-DV

2000
EV-DO Demo

2002 EV-DORel10

2007 HSUPARel 6 & EV-DO Rev A

2006
HSDPA Rel 5

2009
HSPA + Rel 7

2010
EV-DO Rev B

2G+

1988
Qualcomm R&D Conception of
Cellular CDMA

1995
CDMA IS-95A

2000
CDMA 2000 1X


2001
WCDMA Rel99

1985

2020

Consistently growing innovation, large portfolio in China

32% Compound annual growth rate



Fiscal year

Current worldwide Qualcomm patent portfolio
(pending and granted)

Innovation in mobile technology driving trillions of dollars of impact



**\$1.8 trillion
invested in
past 5 years**

R&D and
infrastructure
investments from
2009-2013



**\$3.3 trillion
in revenue**

Revenues of the
global mobile value
chain in 2014



**11 million
jobs**


Jobs in the global
mobile value chain



**Another
\$4 trillion
investment
coming**

Additional R&D and
infrastructure
investments needed
by 2020

IP frameworks and standard setting are two fundamental enablers of mobile's growth




Source: "The Mobile Revolution: How Mobile Technologies Drive a Trillion Dollar Impact", Boston Consulting Group (2015)

Chinese consumers value their mobile device at ~40% of their income, well above US, Germany, Korea, and Brazil

Mobile valued at 20~40% of their income by consumers in emerging economies¹

Mobile valued at ~11% of their income by consumers in developed economies²




1. For Brazil and China, 3G consumers as 4G only very recently rolled-off in both countries 2. Developed country our reference consumer is a 4G user

3. Based on the nominal GDP per capita (2013)

Source: Conjoint analysis, BCG Consumer Impact Survey (USA: n=1003, Germany: n=1014, Korea: n=1002, Brazil: n=1000, China n=1070, India: n=2640)

Mobile contributed to more than \$1.2 trillion to GDP in



IP and antitrust: Technology standards under scrutiny

Concerns raised by FTC, DOJ, and most recently NDRC, about potential “consumer harm” due to IPR related to standards

For example, see:

- FTC (2011) report, “The evolving IP marketplace”
- DOJ (2012) remarks “Six “small” proposals for Standard Setting Organizations (SSOs) before launch”
- Kuhn, Scott-Morton, Shelanski (2013), “SSOs can help solve the Essential Patents licensing problem”

IP and antitrust: technology standards under scrutiny

Example 1: “Patent hold-up”

- With no alternative to a technology standard, patent owners can potentially “hold-up” the standard’s implementers, deriving supracompetitive rents and **harming competition and consumers**

For example:

“Hold-up may have especially severe consequences for innovation and competition in the context of standardized technology.” (FTC (2011) report)

“Patent holders may seek to take advantage of that market power by engaging in one form of patent hold-up, such as excluding a competitor from a market or obtaining an unjustifiably higher price for its invention. Consumers could be harmed as well by (increased consumer prices).” (DOJ (2012) remarks to ITU-T)

IP and antitrust: technology standards under scrutiny

Example 2: “Royalty Stacking”


- Royalties paid by product manufacturers to many different patent owners can add to prohibitively high as a percentage of the product’s value, **diminishing their margins & commercialization incentives**

For example:

“Time and time again, we have seen this sort of royalty-stacking problem arise. One great example is 3G telecom in Europe. The standard-setting organization (SSO) put out a call for essential patents, asking which they must license to make the 3G wireless protocol work and the price at which the patent owners would license their rights. 3G telecom received affirmative responses totaling over 6000 essential patents and the cumulative royalty rate turned out to be 130%. *This is not a formula for a successful product.*” (Lemley (2002))


Theory versus evidence: Lower costs and improved performance of mobile

Consumer cost of data per megabyte relative to data consumption versus data speed




Sources: Cisco Visual Networking Index, ITU, IE Market Research, Motorola, Deutsche Bank, Qualcomm

Theory versus evidence: Lower consumer prices of products as patent owners increase




Source: Gelatovic and Gupta (2015), "Royalty Stacking and Standard Essential Patents: Theory and Evidence from the Mobile Wireless Industry", Hoover IP2 Working Paper

Theory versus evidence: High market entry, more consumer products as patent owners increase



Source: Gelatovic and Gupta (2015), "Royalty Stacking and Standard Essential Patents: Theory and Evidence from the Mobile Wireless Industry.", Hoover IP2 Working Paper

Theory versus evidence: Higher market entry and lower concentration



Source: Gelatovic and Gupta (2015), 'Royalty Stacking and Standard Essential Patents: Theory and Evidence from the Mobile Wireless Industry', Hoover IP2 Working Paper

Need for future research

Filling the gap between theory and evidence

- What explains the disconnect between these policy concerns about competitive harm and the reality of a healthy, thriving industry?
- While one can always argue that the “but for” world would be better in some way, competition concerns demand consideration of objective criteria
- What policies should China and other emerging innovation economies embrace for promoting IP and standards

Thank you

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